In the last post I blogged on the idea of baptism and the inheritance of God's promises made to us in Christ Jesus. There I argued that the person who has come to faith and repentance is already -- and can rightfully call himself -- a Christian. In legal parlance the "right" (or the act of inheriting the promises) is already and fully vested.
If we consider the notion of a "right" or a "promise" for a moment it will become apparent that for every right there is a correlative "obligation" or "duty". If you have a legal right to X it means that someone else (or perhaps everyone) has a legal obligation (or duty) to give you X. You can't have a legal right to X without someone else having an obligation to give you X. In other words if no-one has a legal obligation to give you X you cannot be said to have a legal right to X. So if a society creates (for instance) a legal "right to life" it also creates a correpsonding duty. Ipso facto your right to life implies a legal obligation on others to let you live. Or if I have a legal right to receive $1000 under a contract with you for services rendered then ipso facto you have a legal obligation to pay me $1000. Your right is my obligation and my right is your obligation.
Now talking about our relationship with God in terms of "rights" (and obligations) is somewhat artificial and in a very important sense wrong. No-one approaches God by way of "right". It is all of grace. The only basis on which we can have any fellowship with God is his grace. No-one is worthy to approach God. That said, however, there is still a place for a consideration of "rights" and "obligations" in our relationship with God. Why? Well the last post in a sense covered God's "obligation" towards humans. We talked about the fact that God makes promises to us in Christ Jesus. In a sense those promises impose "obligations" upon God in the sense that if God were to renege on his promises then his conduct would be blameworthy. By making a promise, God has an "obligation" to the beneficiaries of that promise. But it is a self-imposed obligation. No-one or nothing else can impose an obligation on God. His "obligations" arise solely because he is a God who makes promises and whose nature is such that not keeping them would be blameworthy. The last post concerned the question of at what point God's promises accrue to us. By the time of our baptism, assuming we have come to faith and repentance, then the inheritance of God's promises to us has already accrued. God is not "obliged" by his promise to give us any more forgiveness or any more of the Holy Spirit or make us any "more" a Christian than we were on account of the regeneration which wrought in us upon faith and repentance. On account of God having fulfilled his promises to us you already are a Christian if you have been born again of the Holy Spirit upon faith and repentance. Now while baptism does indeed speak to God's relationship to us as humans (and perhaps chiefly speaks this way: in baptism God signs and seals the fact that the person who has exercised faith and repentance has already inherited God's promises to him) it doesn't just speak to this. Baptism also speaks to our relationship to God and this is where the idea of human obligation towards God comes in. Such obligations can be said to arise on two levels:
(1) because God as sovereign creator is King and rightful ruler over us he can (and rightly does) make laws for his subjects which create a general obligation on all human beings;
(2) because God and human beings can and do make promises to one another -- specific obligations can arise out of promises made between two parties.
In both of these there are clear analogues in human law. Examples of the former (general obligations) are the criminal law and the law of tort; an example of the latter (specific obligations) is the law of contracts. The law which says it is a criminal offence to commit murder or to steal or to rape etc are general obligations. I have an obligation not to murder (etc) you regardless of whether we've ever crossed paths before and regardless of whether we make promises to one another about how we will behave towards one another. When the law makes parties to a contract keep to their contractual promises then that is an example of specific obligations. If A enters into a contract with B, with A promising to buy goods from B for the price of $100 then A and B each have rights and obligations under the contract. One such example is that A has a specific obligation to pay $100 to B. But this is a specific obligation between A and B only which exists solely on account of the contractual promise between them. A does not have a general obligation to C, D, E etc (or the world at large) to pay $100. Were it not for the promises they made to one another in the form of a contract A would not have any obligation to pay B $100.
What's more, these general and specific obligations can interact and sometimes overlap. I can enter into a contract and thereby create a specific obligation to myself for something which I already had a general obligation to do. For example I am already obliged not to murder you but I also make a contractual promise with you not to murder you. One does not rule out the other. (But importantly the general obligation not to murder does rule out a specific contractual contract to murder; "contracts" for the murder of someone are not legal contracts; they are by their nature void!). But if for example I do enter into a contract which has the effect of replicating a general duty I already have and then breach that duty (eg I contractually agree not to assault you and then I assault you) I will have breached both a general obligation (in the case of assault an obligation imposed both by the criminal law and the law of tort) and a specific obligation (the obligation not to assault you which arose by virtue of the fact that I contractually promised this to you and contractual promises are legally enforceable -- i.e. give rse to rights and obligations). If you wanted to take me to court you could equally raise either my general obligation or my specific obligation. In actual fact you could (and would) raise both and I would be fully liable on both counts. In both cases the conduct in question (assaulting you) is objectively the same. A witness to the event would say exactly the same thing in a case for breach of contract as he would in a case for a breach of my obligation to you under the law of tort. Moreover, in both cases I would be liable to pay you damages for my wrongdoing. But in another sense there is an important difference between these two cases. The second example is in a sense worse. Why? Well because I specifically promised not to assault you (which I wasn't allowed to anyway) and still did. In the second example I am not just in breach of a general obligation imposed on me whether I like it or not; I am also in breach of a specific obligation I have consciously and voluntarily taken upon myself. I am not just breaking the law; I am also breaking my word. As well as a breach of the law which applies to all and sundry, my conduct here is also a breach of trust between you and me.
Well what does this have to do with God and us, and indeed baptism? Well quite clearly there is a general obligation on every single human being to seek and obey God. God "commands all people everywhere to repent" (Acts 17:30). This applies to everyone -- whether Christian or not, whether baptised or not. Baptised and unbaptised alike who have not repented of their sins and trusted in Jesus are in breach of this general obligation. However, baptism also creates a specific obligation. In your baptism you promise that you have repented and trusted in Jesus. The baptised person who has not repented and trusted in Jesus is not just guilty of a breach of God's general command to repent and believe in Jesus. He is also guilty of a breach of his own specifc undertaking (i.e. his word) that he has repented and trusted in Jesus.
Coming back to our coronation example and the analogy with baptism: As far as the inheritance of the promises is concerned the king's coronation doesn't change anything. He is already king before his coronation. The coronation is an outward and public sign and seal of the fact that he is already really king (i.e. already has inhereited the promises). Before his coronation he was already king and by virtue of that fact he had all the rights and obligations of kingship according to law. However, at his coronation a king also makes certain promises -- personally repeating under oath many of the obligations imposed on him by the constitution. As a matter of constitutional law the king is already obliged to uphold the Protestant Reformed religion and if he he didn't then his conduct would be blameworthy solely on account of that. Such a king would be a law-breaker. But at his coronation he also personally promises to do this and other things. This means that if he didn't do them then he wouldn't just be in breach of a general obligation imposed on him by the law (i.e. a law-breaker) but moreover that he would also be in breach of a specific obligation arising ouit of his promise. In addition to being a law-breaker he would also be a promise-breaker.
And again, so I would submit, it is with baptism.
If we consider the notion of a "right" or a "promise" for a moment it will become apparent that for every right there is a correlative "obligation" or "duty". If you have a legal right to X it means that someone else (or perhaps everyone) has a legal obligation (or duty) to give you X. You can't have a legal right to X without someone else having an obligation to give you X. In other words if no-one has a legal obligation to give you X you cannot be said to have a legal right to X. So if a society creates (for instance) a legal "right to life" it also creates a correpsonding duty. Ipso facto your right to life implies a legal obligation on others to let you live. Or if I have a legal right to receive $1000 under a contract with you for services rendered then ipso facto you have a legal obligation to pay me $1000. Your right is my obligation and my right is your obligation.
Now talking about our relationship with God in terms of "rights" (and obligations) is somewhat artificial and in a very important sense wrong. No-one approaches God by way of "right". It is all of grace. The only basis on which we can have any fellowship with God is his grace. No-one is worthy to approach God. That said, however, there is still a place for a consideration of "rights" and "obligations" in our relationship with God. Why? Well the last post in a sense covered God's "obligation" towards humans. We talked about the fact that God makes promises to us in Christ Jesus. In a sense those promises impose "obligations" upon God in the sense that if God were to renege on his promises then his conduct would be blameworthy. By making a promise, God has an "obligation" to the beneficiaries of that promise. But it is a self-imposed obligation. No-one or nothing else can impose an obligation on God. His "obligations" arise solely because he is a God who makes promises and whose nature is such that not keeping them would be blameworthy. The last post concerned the question of at what point God's promises accrue to us. By the time of our baptism, assuming we have come to faith and repentance, then the inheritance of God's promises to us has already accrued. God is not "obliged" by his promise to give us any more forgiveness or any more of the Holy Spirit or make us any "more" a Christian than we were on account of the regeneration which wrought in us upon faith and repentance. On account of God having fulfilled his promises to us you already are a Christian if you have been born again of the Holy Spirit upon faith and repentance. Now while baptism does indeed speak to God's relationship to us as humans (and perhaps chiefly speaks this way: in baptism God signs and seals the fact that the person who has exercised faith and repentance has already inherited God's promises to him) it doesn't just speak to this. Baptism also speaks to our relationship to God and this is where the idea of human obligation towards God comes in. Such obligations can be said to arise on two levels:
(1) because God as sovereign creator is King and rightful ruler over us he can (and rightly does) make laws for his subjects which create a general obligation on all human beings;
(2) because God and human beings can and do make promises to one another -- specific obligations can arise out of promises made between two parties.
In both of these there are clear analogues in human law. Examples of the former (general obligations) are the criminal law and the law of tort; an example of the latter (specific obligations) is the law of contracts. The law which says it is a criminal offence to commit murder or to steal or to rape etc are general obligations. I have an obligation not to murder (etc) you regardless of whether we've ever crossed paths before and regardless of whether we make promises to one another about how we will behave towards one another. When the law makes parties to a contract keep to their contractual promises then that is an example of specific obligations. If A enters into a contract with B, with A promising to buy goods from B for the price of $100 then A and B each have rights and obligations under the contract. One such example is that A has a specific obligation to pay $100 to B. But this is a specific obligation between A and B only which exists solely on account of the contractual promise between them. A does not have a general obligation to C, D, E etc (or the world at large) to pay $100. Were it not for the promises they made to one another in the form of a contract A would not have any obligation to pay B $100.
What's more, these general and specific obligations can interact and sometimes overlap. I can enter into a contract and thereby create a specific obligation to myself for something which I already had a general obligation to do. For example I am already obliged not to murder you but I also make a contractual promise with you not to murder you. One does not rule out the other. (But importantly the general obligation not to murder does rule out a specific contractual contract to murder; "contracts" for the murder of someone are not legal contracts; they are by their nature void!). But if for example I do enter into a contract which has the effect of replicating a general duty I already have and then breach that duty (eg I contractually agree not to assault you and then I assault you) I will have breached both a general obligation (in the case of assault an obligation imposed both by the criminal law and the law of tort) and a specific obligation (the obligation not to assault you which arose by virtue of the fact that I contractually promised this to you and contractual promises are legally enforceable -- i.e. give rse to rights and obligations). If you wanted to take me to court you could equally raise either my general obligation or my specific obligation. In actual fact you could (and would) raise both and I would be fully liable on both counts. In both cases the conduct in question (assaulting you) is objectively the same. A witness to the event would say exactly the same thing in a case for breach of contract as he would in a case for a breach of my obligation to you under the law of tort. Moreover, in both cases I would be liable to pay you damages for my wrongdoing. But in another sense there is an important difference between these two cases. The second example is in a sense worse. Why? Well because I specifically promised not to assault you (which I wasn't allowed to anyway) and still did. In the second example I am not just in breach of a general obligation imposed on me whether I like it or not; I am also in breach of a specific obligation I have consciously and voluntarily taken upon myself. I am not just breaking the law; I am also breaking my word. As well as a breach of the law which applies to all and sundry, my conduct here is also a breach of trust between you and me.
Well what does this have to do with God and us, and indeed baptism? Well quite clearly there is a general obligation on every single human being to seek and obey God. God "commands all people everywhere to repent" (Acts 17:30). This applies to everyone -- whether Christian or not, whether baptised or not. Baptised and unbaptised alike who have not repented of their sins and trusted in Jesus are in breach of this general obligation. However, baptism also creates a specific obligation. In your baptism you promise that you have repented and trusted in Jesus. The baptised person who has not repented and trusted in Jesus is not just guilty of a breach of God's general command to repent and believe in Jesus. He is also guilty of a breach of his own specifc undertaking (i.e. his word) that he has repented and trusted in Jesus.
Coming back to our coronation example and the analogy with baptism: As far as the inheritance of the promises is concerned the king's coronation doesn't change anything. He is already king before his coronation. The coronation is an outward and public sign and seal of the fact that he is already really king (i.e. already has inhereited the promises). Before his coronation he was already king and by virtue of that fact he had all the rights and obligations of kingship according to law. However, at his coronation a king also makes certain promises -- personally repeating under oath many of the obligations imposed on him by the constitution. As a matter of constitutional law the king is already obliged to uphold the Protestant Reformed religion and if he he didn't then his conduct would be blameworthy solely on account of that. Such a king would be a law-breaker. But at his coronation he also personally promises to do this and other things. This means that if he didn't do them then he wouldn't just be in breach of a general obligation imposed on him by the law (i.e. a law-breaker) but moreover that he would also be in breach of a specific obligation arising ouit of his promise. In addition to being a law-breaker he would also be a promise-breaker.
And again, so I would submit, it is with baptism.
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